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Preparing Cape Verde for the World Trade Organization*
Marjorie Florestal**
In this discussion, I will provide you with brief information about Cape
Verde, and relate my experience as the Senior Legal Advisor on a U.S. Agency
for International Development ("USAID") project designed to prepare Cape
Verde for accession to the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). In the course of
this presentation, I will address the question of how nations with transition
economies create the legal infrastructure necessary to develop and become part
of the global economy, from the perspective of a small and poor island.
1. CAPE VERDE: A BRIEF HISTORYI
Cape Verde is an archipelago of nine inhabited islands off the coast of
Senegal in West Africa. It is located on the western extension of the Sahara
Desert, which means that it is dry and somewhat barren. Volcanic eruptions
created the islands and most of the islands are rocky and mountainous. The
climate is arid and tropical, and it only rains during the short rainy season.
Despite the rainy season's torrential downpours, water remains a scarce
commodity. There are no permanent streams or fresh water wells, and the
landscape is severely eroded through overgrazing and deforestation.
Cape Verde's population is only about 400,000. It is said that more Cape
Verdeans live in New England than in Cape Verde. Surprisingly, the relationship
between Cape Verde and the United States is a long one, dating back to the
nineteenth century when New England whaling ships sailed in to port and took
on Cape Verdean sailors.
The country was a Portuguese colony for over 500 years. The Portuguese
used the islands as way-stations for the transshipment of slaves and other
"goods" bound for the New World. The only roads on the islands were those
leading to the ports so that the Portuguese could ship goods back to Lisbon or
abroad. When the Portuguese left in 1975, there was not a single secondary
school in Cape Verde. As a result, very few people could read or write, and fewer
still had attended high school.
* This article is based on a brief presentation as part of the Symposium held at the University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law on February 20-21, 2004.
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1. For an excellent account of Cape Verde's history, see RICHARD A. LOBBAN, CAPE VERDE: CRIOULO
COLONY TO INDEPENDENT NATION (1995).
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II. THE "BIG BANG"- CAPE VERDE TRANSITIONS
TO A MARKET ECONOMY
The first government to take office in 1975 looked out over the horizon and
saw bleak prospects: an uneducated populace, little infrastructure, no potential
for large-scale agriculture, and little opportunity to create an export economy.
Faced with those challenges, the government turned to a Soviet-style command
economy. The development model it adopted sought to create an internal
market-but what kind of an internal market? Given its environmental and
infrastructure constraints, there was scarce possibility of Cape Verde developing
a self-sustaining economy. The country soon found itself dealing with a massive
debt load, an underdeveloped private sector, a bloated public sector, and little
assistance from the international community. By 1991, the government
acknowledged its economic policy had outlived its usefulness so change was
necessary. With incredible courage, and in one fell swoop, the country moved
away from a command economy to a free market. This was a "Big Bang" rather
than an evolutionary transition. The process actually proved successful. Despite
some of the stark figures I have thrown at you, Cape Verde now has some
inspiring success stories to share both on the political and economic front.
Politically, Cape Verde is a stable, multiparty democracy, which has been
tested. In fact, the country's last presidential election was reminiscent of our
Bush v. Gore debacle. The two candidates were separated by about seventeen
votes. After the presumed winner, Pedro Pires, took office, the Supreme Court
determined that a number of those seventeen votes were fraudulent. It turned out,
or at least many people argued, that the "real" president was the presumed loser,
Carlos Veiga. Rather than allowing the country to descend into violence and
anarchy, Veiga declined to challenge the legitimacy of the elections. For the
greater good of the country, he laid aside his claim to the presidency. That type
of political sacrifice rarely happens in Africa.
The news on the economic front is also encouraging. Per capita income has
risen to about $1,500, which means that the country still qualifies as "least
developed" according to the United Nations' definition, while at the same time
demonstrates real progress for Cape Verde and its people. The literacy rate has
risen to nearly eighty percent and the government ensures access to health care,
medicines, schooling, and other basic services. At independence, the island
nation had no export economy to speak of. However, after the 1991 transition to
a market economy, the country developed a fledging export industry with about
$3 million dollars in export revenue, mainly in footwear, textiles, and some
fisheries exports. Is that a big deal? Not very, but when you are starting from a
base of zero, any progress is dramatic progress and should be encouraged. Now,
the downside is that Cape Verde's imports total nearly $30 million, so you can
see the huge trade imbalance there. They import basically everything and rely
heavily on remittances from expatriates living abroad in order to balance their
accounts.
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But the government does have a plan, and it is an ambitious one. The country
simply cannot support large-scale agriculture since it does not have the natural
resources or sufficient cultivatable land. Although they do have a nascent
fisheries industry, commercial fishing is not possible because they lack a
continental shelf. Instead of looking to these traditional sectors, the government
promotes its services sector-tourism and banking to be precise. To promote
these industries, Cape Verde adopted quite liberal banking and foreign
investment laws. The banking law is really focused on emigrants living abroad.
The economy relies heavily on remittances, and the government wants to
encourage expatriates not just to send money to their families, but to open dollar
or Euro accounts in-country and to invest in real estate. Allowing dollar accounts
and abolishing currency controls also promotes foreign investment in general.
These reform efforts have proved modestly successful. Emigrants are investing
heavily in their home country, mainly through the purchase of homes on the
beach. Foreign investment in the tourism sector has risen from $2 million to
about $27 million in 2001.
In 2002, the government decided to become an active member of the
international trading community. Cape Verde made the decision to join the
World Trade Organization, which is where I came in.
A. David and Goliath Revisited: Cape Verde Seeks to Join the World Trade
Organization
I went to Cape Verde in January 2003, as part of a USAID funded project to
assist the country in joining the WTO. My job as the senior legal advisor was to
assist government officials in drafting the mammoth Foreign Trade
Memorandum ("FTM"), which constitutes the first step in a country's effort to
join the WTO. The FTM requires detailed explanations of a country's legal and
economic infrastructure. These explanations include everything from the way its
judiciary is structured, to the way the government formulates its trade policy, to
its relationship with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The
FTM provides a snapshot of a prospective WTO member's current legal
infrastructure. But a country seeking to join the WTO must be prepared to change
that infrastructure in order to conform to WTO rules.
Probably the first question most people ask me is, "Why would this tiny little
country want to join the WTO?" The question they are really asking is whether a
poor, tiny, export-challenged island nation in Africa can benefit from joining the
world's preeminent trading institution-an institution responsible for managing
over ninety percent of world trade.
Well, let's look at that. Why would Cape Verde want to join? For one thing,
there is a certain amount of rivalry between Cape Verde and other West African
nations. Because of its long history of colonial rule, and given the fact that it is an
island, Cape Verdeans often do not see themselves as "African." Their ties to
Portugal remain unusually close, and historically Cape Verde has been reluctant
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to join African organizations. There is a certain sense among Cape Verdeans that
they are better off than many of their West African neighbors. Admittedly, their
economic indicators are stronger than a number of other African countries. But
Cape Verde remains one of only a small handful of African countries that is not a
member of the WTO. It is fair to say that Cape Verde wants to join the WTO in
part because it does not want to be left out of the prestigious "club" to which its
more impoverished neighbors already belong.
Beyond that political dimension, Cape Verde seeks to join the WTO because
it wants recognition and legitimacy for all of the hard work and tough reforms it
has made so far. The island desperately wants the approval of the international
community, and by "approval," I mean trust. Do not forget that Cape Verde is
staking its economic future on building a strong services market, which is quite
sophisticated. Investors want to know that their money is protected, that the
government's laws and policies conform to international standards and will not
be changed capriciously overnight. Cape Verde needs the credibility that WTO
membership brings.
Leaving aside the reasons why it might want to join, can Cape Verde hope to
benefit from WTO membership? That is a more difficult question. We have few
models to predict what happens when least developed countries sign onto the
WTO. For the most part, and certainly true for African countries, poor countries
became members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")-
the precursor organization to the WTO-as a function of independence. That is,
their former colonial powers sponsored them into the GATT. When the GATT
evolved into the WTO, countries who were already members had an opportunity
to transition more slowly into the requirements of WTO membership. But Cape
Verde is a different example. It will be only the third least developed country to
join the WTO under the full accession process. The first two joined as recently as
September 2003. We simply do not have enough experience or data to know
what happens when we require least developed countries to essentially hit the
ground running. They must become part of the WTO and adopt WTO
requirements at a faster rate than other countries have had to do.
For a country like Cape Verde, that is really a dangerous position to be in.
How does a least developed country ensure that it has the requisite legal
infrastructure in place to be able to join the WTO and to take advantage of the
benefits of membership without imposing an unduly heavy and expensive burden
on itself? This leads to the last point I will address and to the central question of
this conference: How do transition economies build the legal infrastructure to
develop and become part of the global economy?
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B. How Do Transition Economies Build the Legal Infrastructure to Develop and
Become Part of the Global Economy?
In Cape Verde's case, the answer is: "quickly". Circumstances forced the
country to accelerate its development at a dizzying rate. Over the span of just ten
years, from 1991 to 2001, Cape Verde went from state control to a market
economy. Now, it will take the next great leap forward by joining the global
economic order. But WTO accession comes with an expensive price tag. Part of
the tremendous cost that Cape Verde will have to bear is building the legal,
administrative, and enforcement infrastructure necessary to effectively
implement the WTO agreement.
Let me give you two examples of what I mean when I say Cape Verde will
have to build the legal infrastructure to implement the WTO Agreement. Among
other things, the WTO Agreement requires members to have a certain customs
regime in place as well as a regime to provide Intellectual Property protection.
Cape Verde's customs regime is based on a 1950s era Portuguese law. This
system works quite well for the country. Customs fees are the biggest source of
government revenue, and there are few instances of bribery or corruption. But the
customs laws on which Cape Verde operates are outdated by WTO standards and
need to be changed to be in conformity with the WTO Customs Valuation
agreement. If you want to make Cape Verdean officials mad, tell them that they
will have to tinker around with their customs laws. They do not want to do it. But
the WTO not only requires officials to do it, but they must also adopt new
customs measures under an accelerated timetable. My second example has to do
with intellectual property protection. The WTO Agreement requires all members
to adopt an IPR regime; that is, laws and regulations for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. No such regime is currently in place. While much of
the rest of the world had centuries to develop their regimes, Cape Verde will
have to do the same in a handful of years.
The simple reality is that Cape Verde, like other least developed countries,
simply cannot build the legal infrastructure for development on its own. It needs
technical assistance, and it will continue to need assistance for a long time to
come. But what kind of technical assistance am I talking about? In recent years,
this notion of technical assistance fell out of favor because it is perceived as rich
countries imposing a one-size-fits-all solution on developing countries. Certainly,
a number of examples validate that claim. Too often, technical assistance
providers come into a developing country with the idea that the country is a blank
slate upon which Western notions of law can be imprinted. When that happens,
when laws are transported wholesale from Europe or the States and simply
grafted on without taking into consideration local conditions, the transplant fails.
Countries find ingenious ways of adopting these foreign laws in principle while
continuing to enforce their own notions of law and justice.
There are alternatives to an outsider-imposed solution for Cape Verde. The
country has demonstrated a tenacious strength and wisdom that we can learn
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from. The Portuguese certainly did not do Cape Verde any favors, yet the country
managed to come out of a tough situation in relatively good shape. What they
achieved in such a short time, only since 1975, is nothing short of miraculous
under the circumstances. Cape Verde adopted and enforced systems that work for
them in their own context, given their own history and experience. We need to
acknowledge and validate those systems. The technical assistance we provide
needs to lend credibility to what they have achieved so far. We need to allow
more time for least developed countries to adapt to international standards. We
cannot expect them to take on new and complex obligations, and then to
implement those obligations in two or three years. To have such an expectation is
to fool ourselves and set poor countries up for failure.
I have some concerns as Cape Verde moves rapidly towards WTO accession.
I worry that the inevitable economic dislocation that comes from WTO accession
will jeopardize much of the surprising success stories that Cape Verde has to
date. I worry that the kind of assistance we provide will undermine the fragile
can-do attitude that Cape Verdeans embody so well. I worry too about the human
costs of WTO membership. Only one person in Cape Verde had the three-month
WTO training provided in Geneva and speaks English, French, and Portuguese.
She is the WTO expert by default. But much needs to change in Cape Verde, and
there is not a lot of time to do it. The country needs many more trained personnel
before they can adequately respond to the demands of WTO membership.
I do not know how it will all turn out. When I left Cape Verde, the FTM was
complete and sent to the WTO in Geneva. Friends tell me that the accession
process remains on course, and that the government remains committed to it. I
suspect that, with the right kind of assistance, Cape Verde can serve as a model
for other developing and transition economies seeking to join the global
economy. Cape Verdeans have what it takes. The only question is whether we
have what it takes to support them in their efforts, rather than overpowering them
with demands from on high about the way they "should" create and implement
their legal infrastructure. I sincerely hope we too have what it takes.
